P icture what a pandemic might look like at health care institutions. Imagining an increased number of patients or even a bed shortage merely scratches the surface. What would happen if 25% to 30% of the nurses, physicians, technicians, unit clerks, and custodians were too sick to come to work? What if a substantial portion of those who remained healthy did not come in because they were too afraid to work? What if they were quarantined at home? How would your department respond if employees demanded vaccines, but none were available? What if prophylactic medication was needed for 10 days, but the hospital only had enough to hand out 3 days worth, and there was little hope of getting more? What if clinics and emergency departments were not just overloaded with patients, but bombarded with angry mobs? Is it possible that some of the angry mobs could include employees?
If these scenarios seem more like a scene from a movie than a potential reality for an employee health department, think again. Last year, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced that the world is closer to a pandemic than it has been since the last pandemic in 8 1968 (WHO, 2005b . The exact timing of the next influenza pandemic is impossible to predict, but experts generally agree that when one occurs, it will overwhelm available health care systems and facilities. Though specifics are impossible to predict, occupational health nurses should arm themselves with as much information as possible to aid management and employees should a pandemic occur.
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VIRUS BASICS
Avian influenza, specifically the H5Nl subtype, is the organism targeted as a potential source for pandemic in the near future. Many qualities make it of special concern (WHO,2005b): • It is a type A virus, the type responsible for all known prior influenza pandemics. • Unlike many influenza viruses, it can pass directly from birds to humans. • Evidence exists that it can be transmitted from human to human. • It causes severe disease with a mortality rate. • It has recently been found to infect mammals previously immune to H5 viruses, indicating a rapidly changing genetic profile.
The genetic composition of influenza is responsible for its potential as a pandemic source. In a process called assortment, the virus has the ability to exchange gene segments with other viruses sharing the same cell, resulting in an entirely new virus. It also is ca-pable of rapid adaptive mutation, a process that occurs when viruses change during sequential infections of hosts, becoming more transmissible with each generation (WHO, 2005b) . These qualities allow a new influenza virus, to which the human population has no immunity, to develop and circulate quickly. The virus responsible for the 1918 influenza pandemic most likely evolved via adaptive mutation from an avian virus to become the most deadly scourge in recorded history. The pandemic viruses of 1956 and 1968 are known to have been caused by new viruses that contained both human and avian genes (WHO,2005b) .
EVOLUTION OF A THREAT
An examination of the evolution of H5Nl illustrates how rapidly this virus has evolved. Prior to 1997, H5Nl began circulating in Asian poultry, causing mild disease. In 1997, H5Nl mutated to a more lethal form and began killing large numbers of chickens in a dramatically short time period. During this outbreak, 18 humans were infected with the disease and 6 died. Then the virus suddenly disappeared, only to arise again in 2003, when investigations of large chicken "die-offs" in Korea identified H5N 1 as the infectious agent. In the same year, several members of a Hong Kong family contracted H5Nl and died.
By January of2004, several cases of an influenza-like respiratory virus were reported from Hanoi . In Vietnam , large numbers of poultry suffered a die-off from H5Nl. A few weeks later, poultry die-offs were reported in Japan, Th ail and , and other areas of Vietn am. Fi rst rep ort s of poultry di sea se ca me out of Cambodia, Lao s, Ind onesi a, and China; and Th ail and report ed its first human case of H5N I. By Februa ry, poultry H5N I outbrea ks were declared unprecedent ed a nd co ntinued throughout the summer. Mala ysia reported its first case in Augu st, and Thailand reported an al arming case of probabl e human -to-human transmission in a fam ily cluster of H5Nl. By the end of 2004, H5Nl was con sidered to be ende mic in many parts of Asia and had expa nded to mammal s not pre viou sly vulnera ble to infl uenza A, such as tiger s and ca ts . It was a lso found for th e fi rst time in wild birds th at sha re mi gratory pathways with North Amer ica n bird s (WHO, 2005b) .
HEALTH CARE WORKER EXPOSURE
At thi s point, the major ity of studies indi cat e that H5Nl is not tran sm itt ed eas ily to health care workers . In 2004, health care workers exp osed to H5Nl-infected patie nts in Thailand wer e exa mined and none of the participant s of the stu dy (83% of exposed he alth ca re worker s) had clinical or lab or ator y evide nce of seroconversion despite providing care within a close range without appropri ate perso na l prot ecti ve equipment (PPE) (Apisarn tha na ra k et aI., 2005) . Two Vietna m studies a lso showed no evi de nce of tran sm ission of H5NI to health ca re workers despite lack of appro priate PPE and infection co ntrol me asures ( Clinical Rounds: Hospital Link who ca red for H5NI -infected patient s. Se ro log ica l ana lysis indic ated H5N 1 antibo dies were present in a low but sta tis tica lly signif ica nt numb er of exposed health ca re workers when co mpared to non-exposed health care workers . Th e study suggested th at workers who had bathed or cha nge d bedding had a greater risk of seroconvers ion. Altho ugh no health ca re wor kers became ill and seroc onversion was un comm on, the study prov ides the first epide mio log ica l evide nce th at H5N I tra nsmission fro m pat ient to health care wor ker ca n occ ur (Bridges et a I., 20 00) . A ca se report of a clu ster of vira l illnesses in the fami ly of a patient who died from H5N l influenza found that H5Nl ill ness in the patient's caretakers was most likely from human-to-human tr ansmission (Ungchusak et aI., 200 5) .
O verall, th e few studies in wh ich H5Nl illness in health ca re workers was exa mi ne d are reassuring. In th e only st udy th at discovered seroconversion, no ac tual illness was docume nte d. Other studies found no ill ness a nd no seroconversion despite initial in ade qu ate in fecti on co ntrol me asures. However, it is important to re ali ze tha t in th e few studies of N5N l ill ness in health ca re worke rs , num bers are sma ll and represent health care wor kers providing care to o nly o ne or two pat ie nts. It is d iffic ult to make genera l ext rap olat ion s fro m the se kinds of studies.
INFECTION CONTROL GUIDELINES
Unlike other infectiou s di seases, infection co ntro l guidelines for H5Nl are two-fold-to prevent transmi ssion to others and to decrease opportunity for vira l reassortment. Th e Cent ers for Disease Control and Preventi on (CDC) inter im guide lines ca ll for co ugh etiquett e, ca reful hand hygiene, gloves, gowns , ded icated equ ipment (e.g., stethosco pes , blood pressure cuffs, thermometer s), and eye protecti on (CDC , 2004) . Patients suspected of H5Nl in fection should be placed in an airborne isolation room, and all tho se entering should wear fit-te sted respirators. Health care workers car ing for such patients should rece ive the cur rent influen za vaccine a nd should self monitor for the developm ent of fever, respiratory symptoms, and co nj unctivitis for at least I week followi ng the last exposure (CDC, 2004) .
PANDEMICS AND HEALTH CARE RESOURCES
Histori cally, pandemics have overw helmed existing healt h ca re resources. In 1918, it was estimated that 25 % to 30 % of the globa l population became ill (W HO, 2005 b) . Medical supplies a nd hospital beds were in short supply, as were coffins and burial space . The supply of gauze qu ickly ra n out as people began to fashion themselves informal surgi cal masks.
In 1957, an influenza vaccine was available for the first tim e, but quant ities were too lim ited for extensive use, allowi ng vacci nation of priority gro ups only (WHO, 2005 b) . In the 1968 pandem ic, a similar scene played out with vaccine supply manu facturing and distribution occurri ng too late to effec t the pand em ic (W HO, 2005b) .
Publ ic health measures of qu aranti ne, travel co ntrol, crow d restriction, and schoo l clos ure have not been show n to stop pand em ics in the past. However because they can impede the spread of disease, these measures sho uld be implement ed . Th e resulting dela y ca n flatten the epidemiological peak, giving the health care system a chance to acquire and distribute vaccines and improve the ability of hospitals and health care providers to cope with increased demands. WHO estimates that for every delay of 1 day, 5 million vaccines may potentially be manufactured (WHO,2005b) .
Vaccines
Currently there is no vaccine for H5Nl (CDC, 2005) . WHO has developed a prototype vaccine, but it is not yet available to the general public (WHO, 2005a) . Health care workers who may be involved in caring for patients with H5l should be vaccinated with the most current seasonal flu vaccine. Although it may not provide protection against H5Nl, it may prevent the process of reassortrnent, leaving less opportunity for the development of a virus that efficiently spreads from human to human (CDC, 2004) .
Medication
Antiviral medications have a role in prophylaxis and treatment of influenza. Unfortunately, H5Nl has shown resistance to amantadine and rirnantadine, the older generation of medications. However, the virus is considered to be susceptible to oseltamivir and zanamivir (M2 blockers). M2 blockers may have a role in prophylaxis, although they have not yet been proven in a pandemic scenario. A critical problem in case of a pandemic will be 10 ---_._---Clinical Rounds: Hospital link availability and price (CDC, 2004; WHO,2005b) .
THE ROLE OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NURSES
Preparation and knowledge are two of the best tools in an occupational health nurse's arsenal. Because a pandemic will strain existing health care resources and affect health care providers as both clients and clinicians, employee health departments must be prepared. Occupational nurses should be involved in institutional planning for pandemics and for mass vaccination or prophylaxis campaigns.
